Prihod napačne revolucije v Slovenijo (2.del)

V mesecih gospodarske in finančne krizo, po odločilnih trenutkih strmega padanja borznih indeksov smo se vsi opremili z ekonomsko teorijo in ponovno pričeli filozofsko proučevati slabosti ureditve ter iskati alternative. Še zdaleč se s tem niso pričeli ubadati vsi, ali tisti najbolj poklicani za iskanje rešitev. V senci krize se je na polju političnega odprl edinstven in neprecenljiv prostor za snovanje novih absurdnih političnih ciljev.

Za Italjo vemo, da nižje kot je sedaj ni bila dolgo časa - v nekaterih pogledih še precej dlje kot od Mussolinija. Zato ne smemo rahlodušno jemati takih poročil...

Sloveniji v preteklih desetih letih podobno uspeva razgradnja principov naše vizije samostojne države. Za porast različnih oblik nestrpnosti: družbenih, rasnih, državno-sosedskih itd... so v celotni meri krive vladajoče politične elite, tako leve kot desne.

Veliko bolj resno pa velja jemati desničarsko populistično prizadevanje za diskreditacijo in degradacijo sodnega sistema; nedavno je postalo jasno, da se je t.i. ' ideja ljudske volje neke druge republike' začela nevarno širiti med zmernimi ljudmi. Predmet debate ni enostavna igra, v kateri mirno iz kodificirane zakonodaje preidemo na pravo ljudske presoje. Primeri nestrpnosti (zadnji obračun z Mitjo Blažičem) več kot očitno nakazujejo na postopno uvajanje slednjega. Ne pozabimo, da so vsi kritični politiki z Janšo na čelu imeli oblast v rokah ter možnost izboljšati razmere. A brez konkretnih idej in rešitev so pripeljali samo do 'bele stavke'.

Zakaj nas je lahko precej bolj strah politične krize kot ekonomske in kaj nas zgodovina uči?

50. Jazz Festival Ljubljana

Jubilejno in v zivo - Krizanke. Avishai. Druzabno kot zmeraj.In stari znanci.

Tri dni prepozno, Sloveniji za 18. r.d.

Malo gledam tretji kanal RTV. Spet vrtijo dnevnike in oddaje iz leta 91, najbrž v luči Türkove pobude za domoljublje.

Ne glede na vse, si ne znam predstavljat, da bi dolgoročno živel kje drugje...

Revolucija v Sloveniji? Kmalu, kmalu...

Vse bolj se približujemo dnevu, ko tudi v Sloveniji ne bo preostalo drugega kot vstaja proti vladajočim elitam - političnim in gospodarskim. Vse skupaj spominja na staro osnovnošolsko igro. med dvema ognjema. Eno stran vodi nesposobna politična elita z dvema konzuloma - šefoma vladajoče stranke ter opozicije, drugo stran nesposobni menedžerski establišment s kameleonskimi konzulom imenovanim tajkun. Vmes raztreseno ljudstvo, opijanjeno od naših astronomskih uspehov po odcepitvi od Jugoslavije, ki teka sem ter tja med 'dvema ognjema'.

Z Golobičevo lažjo se je tudi na simbolni ravni končalo (ne)etično razlikovanje med tajkunskimi 'osamosvojitelji desnice' ter progresivnim upanjem levice za boljšo slovensko politiko. To dejanje je uspelo dokončno definirati obstoječo slovensko politično elito za uniformno, čisto odtujeno kasto, daleč stran od ljudstva kateremu vlada.

V ZDA so se v predsedniški kampaniji Obame ubadali z novim upanjem za spremembe, pri nas smo z zadnjo lažjo v Sloveniji pokončali upanje za obstoječo politično garnituro oz. generacijo. Počasi prihaja čas, da slovenski osamosvojitelji in tvorci 'slovenske pravljice' najdejo svojo pot v učbenike zgodovine, arhive RS, ter mirne hišice za njihovo upokojitev.

V Iranu so sumljive volitve sprožile močan odpor in možne zametke revolucije, nič ne bi bilo narobe, če bi na slovenskem podobno zanetila gospodarska kriza...

Izgleda, da nas res lahko reši posttranzicijska revolucija! Moč znanju!

Paul Samuelson - intervju v Atlanticu

Very last thing. What would you say to someone starting graduate study in economics? Where do you think the big developments in modern macro are going to be, or in the micro foundations of modern macro? Where does it go from here and how does the current crisis change it?

Well, I'd say, and this is probably a change from what I would have said when I was younger: Have a very healthy respect for the study of economic history, because that's the raw material out of which any of your conjectures or testings will come. And I think the recent period has illustrated that. The governor of the Bank of England seems to have forgotten or not known that there was no bank insurance in England, so when Northern Rock got a run, he was surprised. Well, he shouldn't have been.

But history doesn't tell its own story. You've got to bring to it all the statistical testings that are possible. And we have a lot more information now than we used to.

Prvi del intervjuja

Drugi del intervjuja

Ekonomska zgodovina - ključ do umevanja sodobnega ekonomskega ustroja.

Skoraj bolj kot sam intervju so zanimivi komentarji spodaj. Resnično dobivam strahospoštovanje nad ameriškimi politiki in mediji, kako dobro so uspeli naslikati grozečo se prikazen - komunizem. Tak strah pred njim kot se čuti v komentarjih bralcev je nekaj fascinantnega, brezhiben konstrukt čiste ideologije.

Izgubljena ekonomska modrost - K. Polanyi

1.del, 1.poglavje - Stoletni mir

No all-around inquiry into the nature of international banking in the nineteenth century has yet been undertaken; this mysterious institution has hardly emerged from the chiaroscuro of politico-economic mythology. Some contended that it was merely the tool of governments; others, that the governments were the instruments of its unquenchable thirst for gain; some, that it was the sower of international discord; others, that it was the vehicle of an effeminate cosmopolitanism sapping the strength of virile nations. None was quite mistaken. Haute finance, an institution sui generis, peculiar to the last third of the nineteenth and the first third of the twentieth century, functioned as the main link between the political and the economic organization of the world in this period. It supplied the instruments for an international peace system, which was worked with the help of the Powers, but which the Powers themselves could neither have established nor maintained. While the Concert of Europe acted only at intervals, haute finance functioned as a permanent agency of the most elastic kind. Independent of single governments, even of the most powerful, it was in touch with all; independent of the central banks, even of the Bank of England, it was closely connected with them. There was intimate contact between finance and diplomacy; neither would consider any long-range plan, whether peaceful or warlike, without making sure of the other's good will. Yet the secret of the successful maintenance of general peace lay undoubtedly in the position, organization, and techniques of international finance.

Organizationally, haute finance was the nucleus of one of the most complex institutions the history of man has produced. Transitory though it was, it compared in catholicity, in the profusion of forms and instruments, only with the whole of human pursuits in industry and trade of which it became in some sort the mirror and counterpart. Besides the international center, haute finance proper, there were some half dozen national centers hiving around their banks of issue and stock exchanges. Also, international banking was not restricted to the financing of governments, their adventures in war and peace; it comprised foreign investment in industry, public utilities, and banks, as well as long-term loans to public and private corporations abroad. National finance again was a microcosm. England alone counted half a hundred different types of banks; France's and Germany's banking organization, too, was specific; and in each of these countries the practices of the Treasury and its relations to private finance varied in the most striking, and, often, as to detail, most subtle way. The money market dealt with a multitude of commercial bills, overseas acceptances, pure financial bills, as well as call money and other stockbrokers' facilities. The pattern was checkered by an infinite variety of national groups and personalities, each with its peculiar type of prestige and standing, authority and loyalty, its assets of money and contact, of patronage and social aura.

Haute finance was not designed as an instrument of peace; this function fell to it by accident, as historians would say, while the sociologist might prefer to call it the law of availability. The motive of haute finance was gain; to attain it, it was necessary to keep in with the governments whose end was power and conquest. We may safely neglect at this stage the distinction between political and economic power, between economic and political purposes on the part of the governments; in effect, it was the characteristic of the nation-states in this period that such a distinction had but little reality, for whatever their aims, the governments strove to achieve them through the use and increase of national power. The organization and personnel of haute finance, on the other hand, was international, yet not, therefore, altogether independent of national organization. For haute finance as an activating center of bankers' participation in syndicates and consortia, investment groups, foreign loans, financial controls, or other transactions of an ambitious scope, was bound to seek the co-operation of national banking, national capital, national finance. Though national finance, as a rule, was less subservient to government than national industry, it was still sufficiently so to make international finance eager to keep in touch with the governments themselves. Yet to the degree to which - in virtue of its position and personnel, its private fortune and affiliations - it was actually independent of any single government, it was able to serve a new interest, which had no specific organ of its own, for the service of which no other institution happened to be available, and which was nevertheless of vital importance to the community: namely, peace. Not peace at all cost, not even peace at the price of any ingredient of independence, sovereignty, vested glory, or future aspirations of the powers concerned, but nevertheless peace, if it was possible to attain it without such sacrifice.

* * *

Karl Polanyi: Velika preobrazba (1944)

Današnje težave z 'visokimi financami' niso nova zgodba v človeški zgodovini. Ekonomski zgodovinarji nekoliko špekulirajo, da so bile vedno doslej predhodnica resnejšim političnim in gospodarskim krizam. K. Polanyi je v Veliki preobrazbi (v prvem in tretjem delu)razdelal krizo industrijskega razcveta 19. stoletja in nastavke za vzpon fašizma in nacizma v letih po prvi svetovni vojni in veliki depresiji.

Vprašanje se zastavlja samo zase: najprej, zakaj vedno znova pozabimo vse te ugotovitve iz naše preteklosti? in drugič, če se težave začnejo pojavljati kronično, kje je prelomnica in njihova ukinitev?

Toliko zgodovinskih dejstev - ne o koncu zgodovine, marveč o ponavljanju zgodovine in iste napake. Toliko o tem zakaj se danes prvo rešuje bankirje in bančni sistem.

Išče se nova ureditev...

Tivolski letni časi (kvadriptih, poliptih??)

Fotke niso ne vem kaj - SE P1i .. trenutek, ali bolje, letni čas šteje!